Essentials of Constructive Heterodoxy: Behavior by Kakarot-Handtke, Egmont
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Essentials of Constructive Heterodoxy:
Behavior
Egmont Kakarot-Handtke
University of Stuttgart, Institute of Economics and Law
30. April 2015
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/64035/
MPRA Paper No. 64035, posted 1. May 2015 05:58 UTC
Essentials of Constructive Heterodoxy: Behavior
Egmont Kakarot-Handtke*
Abstract
For a host of compelling methodological reasons, homo oeconomicus has to
be replaced. This is consensus, the open question is how this could be ac-
complished. What is required first is the separation of the formal foundations
into a structural and a behavioral part. This paper introduces the propensity
function as general formalization of Economic Man/Woman. The propensity
function is a compact formal expression of random, semi-random, and deter-
ministic behavioral assumptions. It is shown how, in a random environment,
target-oriented behavior produces stochastic stability and optimality in the
product market. With homo oeconomicus the conception of simultaneous
equilibrium, too, vanishes.
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1 Farewell to homo oeconomicus
No science has been criticized by its own servants as openly and
constantly as economics. The motives of dissatisfaction are many,
but the most important pertains to the fiction of homo oeconomicus.
(Georgescu-Roegen, 1971, p. 1)
It is by now well-understood that the homo oeconomicus approach with utility
and profit maximization is not only unconvincing because of manifest unrealism,
as common sense has persistently argued, but because it cannot work for deeper
methodological reasons.
The predictive weakness of theories couched in intensional vocabulary
do not correlate in a manageable way with the vocabulary of other
successful scientific theories; they do not divide nature at the joints; . . .
(Rosenberg, 1994, p. 224)
To properly divide the economy at the joints the formal foundations are in the
following separated into the structural axiom set and the propensity function. The
subject matter of theoretical economics is twofold, it embraces the behavior of the
economic system and human behavior. The crucial methodological point is that the
system has analytical precedence.
Conventional economics rests on behavioral assumptions that are formally expressed
as axioms (McKenzie, 2008). Axioms are indispensable to build up a theory that
epitomizes formal and material consistency. The fatal flaw of the standard approach
is that – as a matter of principle – human behavior does not yield to axiomatization.
While the axiomatization of human behavior is in the last instance self-contradictory
(Blaug, 1992, pp. 162-169) the axiomatization of the monetary economy’s funda-
mental structure is feasible. Structural axioms are free of any explicit or implicit
behavioral assumptions. This means that a general formal complement is required
that captures human behavior as far as it is relevant for the functioning of the
economic system.
The present paper deals with the interaction of structural axiomatic core and the
general behavioral propensity function and shows how this interaction produces
dynamically stable outcomes in the product market.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 provides the formal foundations with the set of four
structural axioms. The objective systemic structure is then formally supplemented
in Section 3 by the behavioral propensity function. This function is the general
expression of the intentionality of human action. In Sections 4 and 5 the two formal
building blocks of every consistent economic model are applied to the problem of
product market clearing in a random environment. Section 6 concludes.
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2 Axioms and assumptions
The new formal foundations of theoretical economics define the interdependencies
of the real and nominal variables that constitute the consumption economy as the
elementary core of the monetary economy.
The first three structural axioms relate to income, production, and expenditure
in a period of arbitrary length. The period length is conveniently assumed to be
the calendar year. Simplicity demands that we have for the beginning one world
economy, one firm, and one product.
Total income of the household sector Y in period t is the sum of wage income, i.e.,
the product of wage rate W and working hours L, and distributed profit, i.e., the
product of dividend D and the number of shares N. Nothing is implied at this stage
about who owns the shares.
Y =WL+DN (1)
The period counter t runs from 0, the initial period, to ∞. An anchoring in historical
time is possible but not necessary at the very beginning of the analysis.
Output of the business sector O is the product of productivity R and working hours.
O = RL (2)
The productivity R depends on the underlying production process. The 2nd axiom
should therefore not be misinterpreted as a linear production function. Geomet-
rically the 2nd axiom is a ray from the coordinate origin that tracks underlying
discontinuous non-linearities; it does not contain any implicit assumption about
increasing or decreasing returns.
Consumption expenditures C of the household sector is the product of price P and
quantity bought X .
C = PX (3)
The axioms represent the pure consumption economy, that is, no investment, no
foreign trade, and no government.
The period values of the axiomatic variables are formally connected by the familiar
growth equation, which is added as the 4th axiom.
Zt = Zt−1
(
1+
...
Zt
)
or
Zt = Z0 (1+
...
Z 1)(1+
...
Z 2) . . .(1+
...
Z t) = Z0
t
∏
t=1
(1+
...
Z t) .
with
Z←W, L, D, N, R, P, X , . . .
(4)
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The path of the representative variable Zt is determined by the initial value Z0 and
the rates of change
...
Z t for each period. Each path has three segments: past, present,
future. The past rates of change are known and can be inserted into (4). The axioms
contain the minimum number of variables. Seven of the variables are elementary,
three are composed. Figure 1 is the graphical representation of the first four axioms.
Figure 1: The pure consumption economy: paths of the seven elementary axiomatic variables
W, L, D, N, R, P, X from the initial period t = 0 until period t = 50 as defined by independent
symmetrical random rates of change. All paths are numerically expressed in terms of their respective
initial values, therefore they start collectively at the index point 1.
Assumptions are a necessary ingredient of any theory. Their justification or, as
the case may be, their futility materializes in the course of the analysis. What
has to be avoided for compelling methodological reasons is assumptionism. It
should be obvious that it is illegitimate to take assumptions like equilibrium, perfect
competition, well-behaved production functions, optimization, etc. into the premises.
Assumptionism introduces physical or psychological nonentities and thereby creates
a parallel world with no connection to the economy we happen to live in. The specific
difficulty with nonentities is sometimes that they cannot be readily recognized or
disproved. So, most economists have not realized that equilibrium is a nonentity.
The set of objective structural axioms constitutes the minimum of premises. The
economic content of the four axioms is perfectly transparent. The point to emphasize
is that total income in (1) is the sum of wage income and distributed profit and not
of wage income and profit.
For a start it is assumed that the elementary axiomatic variables vary at random.
This produces an evolving economy. The respective probability distributions of the
change rates are given in general form by:
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Pr
(
lW ≤
...
W ≤ uW
)
Pr (lR ≤
...
R ≤ uR)
Pr (lL ≤
...
L ≤ uL) Pr (lP ≤
...
P ≤ uP)
Pr (lD ≤
...
D ≤ uD) Pr (lX ≤
...
X ≤ uX)
Pr (lN ≤
...
N ≤ uN)
(5)
The four axioms, including (5), constitute a stochastic simulation.
It is, of course, also possible to switch to a completely deterministic rate of change
for any variable and any period. The structural formalism does not require a
preliminary decision between determinism and indeterminism.
Before the formalism can be applied concrete assumptions about the initial condi-
tions and the upper (u) and lower (l) bounds of the probability distributions have
to be made. This is the point where input from experience is needed. We know
from observation for instance that productivity changes lie normally between, say,
5 percent and 0 percent per period.
We know that probability distributions may change over time and that accidents do
happen. What we do not know is the exact date and extent of a possible accident in
the future. For a start these features of reality are excluded from the analysis. They
may be taken in as soon as the elementary relationships have been clarified.
A simulation yields a scenario and not a prediction. Each scenario is fully deter-
mined, explicit, and traceable in every detail. A simulation as defined by the four
structural axioms and the probability distributions is a well-defined mathematical
object just like a system of equations. While they are formally on the same footing,
both mathematical objects yield different kinds of outputs: the system of equations
yields a solution vector, a simulation yields a bundle of paths. This bundle has a
counterpart in reality.
The upper (u) and lower (l) bounds of the respective probability distributions are, for
a start, taken to be symmetrical around zero. This produces a drifting or stationary
economy as a limiting case of the growing economy. There is no need at this early
stage to discuss the merits and demerits of different probability distributions. Eq. (5)
represents the general stochastic case which in the limit u− l → 0 shades into
determinism. The evolving consumption economy contains no subjective elements.
3 The propensity function
Axiomatization provides the bare structural bones. The first question is how the
rates of change of the elementary variables are determined. The obvious next step is
to invoke both, purposeful agents and pure randomness, to ‘animate’ (Popper, 1994,
p. 164) the formalized economy. To prepare for a general answer, the rate of change
of the representative variable
...
Z is replaced by a set of possible outcomes {...Z}. Its
rationale is outlined in Figure 2.
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Propensity type Observer’s state of knowledge Set of possible outcomes
{...Z}
A: Uncertainty a) definitive, i.e., proven by an impossibility
theorem, or, b) contingent, i.e., , may be
overcome with better methods or tools
{−100%≤ ...Z < ∞}
Pr (•) not defined
B: Randomness The set of possible outcomes is inductively
inferred from more or less sophisticated
observations (xB1, xB2, . . .) that display no
dominant influence {...Z}= fB (xB1, xB2, . . .)
e.g. {−3%≤ ...Z ≤ 3%}
Pr (•) equally distributed
C: Directed
randomness
One conjectures a direction of change (−1,0,1)
and has a hypothesis that explains it in the logical
format if [antecedent] then (−1;0;1);
{...Z}= fC (xC1, xC2, . . .)
e.g.
(−1;0;1){0%≤ ...Z ≤ 3%}
Pr (•) equally distributed
D: Dependency One has a sufficiently specified hypothesis about
the influence of the independent variables
(xD1, xD2, . . .): {
...
Z}= fD (xD1, xD2, . . .)
e.g. {7.2%±0,3%}
Pr =0.99
E. Determinism One has a law and knows the boundary
conditions: {...Z}= fE (xE1, xE2, . . .)
e.g. {7.19470%}
Pr =1
Figure 2: The propensity function covers five logical types that enable the derivation of the rates of
change of the elementary axiomatic variables in period t
Figure 2 is consolidated to the propensity function (6) with
...
Z at first standing for
the rates of change of the seven elementary variables in eq. (4).1 The propensity
function yields a definite rate of change for each period:
...
Z = (−1,0,1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Direction
Pr ({...Z})︸ ︷︷ ︸
Magnitude
. (6)
The two components of the propensity function are direction and magnitude. In
the limiting case of uncertainty, type-A, the propensity function has to be defined
ad hoc. In the limiting case of determinism, type-E, everything is defined by the
magnitude bracket, the value in the direction bracket is unity by default. At the
moment no deterministic behavioral functions are known in economics. Type-A
represents the status quo, i.e., that we have no a priori knowledge of the set of
possible outcomes or any determinants of (6).2 To get things going we have to take
type-B as the minimalist starting point of behavioral analysis:
1 The term propensity is here used in the sense of (Popper, 1990).
2 Shackle regarded the explicit recognition of uncertainty as Keynes’s ‘big thing’ (2010, p. 135).
Uncertainty subsequently became the trademark of Post Keynesianism. In the present context it is
kept in the background because, quite naturally, not much more can be said about it than “We simply
do not know” (Keynes, 1937, p. 214).
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The simplest hypothesis is that variation is random until the contrary
is shown, the onus of the proof resting on the advocate of the more
complicated hypothesis ... . (Kreuzenkamp and McAleer, 1995, p. 12)
The magnitude of the rate of change is in the following left to chance. The agents
are supposed to determine the direction of change.
3.1 The pure logic of behavior
The direction of change is captured in a general form by a signum function that de-
termines the algebraic sign of the random rate of change of the axiomatic variables:
(−1,0,1)Z = sgn(if [A]) . (7)
The direction, i.e., -1=down and +1=up, is conditional on whether one or more
antecedents are satisfied or not. The antecedent [A] is a shorthand for conditions of
any degree of sophistication expressed by the operators >, <, =, AND, OR etc. and
variables with a time index t or prior. Type-C is the formal container for a familiar
conception that has been identified as ‘qualitative prediction’ (Rosenberg, 1992,
p. 68). The notion of directionality is by no means new in economics and can be
traced back to J. S. Mill:
Doubtless, a man often asserts of an entire class what is only true of
a part of it; but his error generally consists not of making too wide an
assertion, but in making the wrong kind of assertion: he predicated an
actual result, when he should only have predicated a tendency to the
result – a power acting with certain intensity in that direction. (Mill,
2004, p. 123), original emphasis
Type-C does exactly this: it predicates a behavioral tendency or, more specific, a
conditional direction of change.
It is important to note that the axiomatic core is not affected when a specific behav-
ioral hypothesis, which is embodied in the propensity function, is falsified. One of
the outstanding characteristics of the structural axiomatic approach is the separabil-
ity of the behavioral and non-behavioral fundamentals. This carries with it the option
to employ neoclassical or Keynesian or evolutionary behavioral assumptions within
one formal framework. Because it is compatible with any behavioral assumption
the structural axiom set is intrinsically general.
The magnitude of the rate of change depends on the inductively inferred probability
distribution and one has no a priori reason to assume either a discrete or a contin-
uous random variable or a specific distribution. Therefore, the uniform discrete
distributions in Figure 2 have to be taken as a pragmatic point of departure which
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in no way prevents the eventual introduction of, for example, a Gauss distribution.
The propensity function (6) is a comprehensive blank form open to progressive
specification. It demands no ontological commitment to either determinism or
indeterminism.
Formally, for every variable of the structural axiomatic formalism there exists a
reference or target variable. The realized values of the variables are superimposed
by desired values.
Z 99K Zθ (8)
Let, for instance, Z stand for the actual stock of money in period t then Zθ stands
for the desired stock. And so on for all variables that formally compose the system.
What we can say with certainty is that there are three logical configurations for the
relation between the actual value of a variable and the target value:
Z−Zθ T 0. (9)
The most general assertion about human behavior is that it is target-oriented or
intentional.
Z−Zθ ⇒ 0 (10)
In formal terms this means that the difference between the actual value of a variable
and the target value should eventually become zero. At the moment it is open how
the agent can achieve this. Note that the target may vary in the course of time. Note
also that expectations can only influence the target value, not the realized value.
In its generalized form the propensity function asserts that the directed rates of
change
...
Z , i.e., the bounded change vectors, are to different degrees dependent on the
state of the world at the beginning of period t or earlier. This state is characterized
in the simplest case by the difference between the actual value of another variable Z
and an appropriate target or, more general, reference value Zθ . The explicit function
that determines the direction of change of
...
Z has therefore two parts and reads:
(−1,0,1)Z︸ ︷︷ ︸
Direction
= sgn
(
sgn
(
Z−Zθ
))
. (11)
The reference value Zθ may, for instance, be the profit maximum given the actual
state of expectations and Z may stand for the quantity bought/sold X . The agent
then changes this quantity in order to come ever closer to the profit maximum.
It is worth emphasizing that (11) is purely formal and, at this stage, does not contain
more philosophy, sociology or psychology than that human behavior is directed in a
random environment. We have now to determine in more detail how this works.
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3.2 The information and the action function
Economic man/woman in the structural axiomatic context at first chooses an infor-
mation source and this entails that there is more than one available. It is assumed
here that the set of information sources is restricted to the variables of the axiom set.
The information function contains two variables: the realized value Z of the chosen
variable and the reference value Zθ .
The reference value can be taken as the concrete result of an optimization procedure,
such that the value of Zθ in period t is the subjectively most preferred among all
other possible values given the subjective knowledge of the situation in period t and
given the actual expectations (cf. Arnsperger and Varoufakis, 2006, p. 9; Georgescu-
Roegen, 1966, p. 243). The reference value, however, has a wider meaning as
we shall see in the following. We refrain here from speculating about what goes
on in the head of an agent and treat the reference value as open interface to any
promising behavioral approach that is capable of providing the value. We have at the
moment no indication of how alterations of the reference value are brought about.
It is assumed in the interim that it follows a type-B random path. The information
function that yields one of three possible values is specified as:
(−1,0,1) = sgn
(
Z−Zθ
)
. (12)
It is certainly not the case that real world agents expect that the actual value of
a variable is exactly equal to the corresponding reference value and that they im-
mediately react to the smallest deviation. On the contrary, infinitesimal precision,
which is an implicit property of standard equilibrium models, has to be rejected
as a distorting idealization. Every action entails set-up costs and therefore inertia.
To explicitly account for the inexactitude of the information function the notion of
inertia is introduced with the parameter i:
(−1,0,1) = sgn
(
Z−
(
Zθ ± ι
))
. (13)
Since only the sign of the difference of the realized value Z and the reference value
Zθ is of interest there is no urgent need for economic man/woman to measure
these values with high precision. All that is needed is that economic man/woman
can ascertain one of the relations: greater than, less than, or roughly equal. So
measurement errors or a rule of thumb attitude does not impair the functioning
of (13).
In a random environment it makes good economic sense not to react to small changes
and deviations because it is to be expected that they, more often than not, cancel out
in the following periods. The magnitude of the inertia parameter in (13) therefore
determines the sensitivity of the whole system. In order to keep the following
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signum functions legible the inertia parameter is omitted with the understanding
that it normally has a value greater than zero.
Next, economic man/woman has to choose an action or instrument variable. It is
assumed that the set of action variables consists of the variables of the axiom set.
The subsets, however, are different for the business and the household sector. The
quantity bought X belongs to the households’ subset but not the firms’.
The action variable is dependent upon the output of the information function. The
direction for the random rate of change of the action variable Z is then given by:
(−1,0,1)Z = sgn︸ ︷︷ ︸
Action
(
sgn
(
Z−Zθ
))
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Information
|t. (14)
The sign of the rate of change of the action variable depends on the sign that is
provided by the information function. We thus have nine combinatorial variants of
the relations between information and action as exhibited in Figure 3.
output information function
input action function
-1 0 1
output -1 a1 b# c1
action 0 a# b2 c#
function 1 a3 b# c3
Figure 3: The explicit signum function (14) as product of the information and action function
From the nine possible combinations four are singled out as momentarily not
feasible. The agent is not allowed not to act (a#, c#) and he is only allowed to act
with a good reason, that is, he is not allowed to act spontaneously (b#). For a plus
or minus input from the information function economic man/woman has to choose
between two possibilities (c1, c3 respectively a1, a3). For a zero input, i.e., the
realized value is equal to the reference value, no action results (b2).
If the information function refers, for example, to the stock of final products O¯ and
if the price P has been chosen as action variable (instead of, say, employment) and
the output of the information function is a plus, i.e., O¯ > O¯θ , then the firm has to
choose either a price increase (c3) or a price reduction (c1). This is an ordinal choice
and it is understood that the agent believes that his action will bring him closer
to the reference value, that is, from worse off to better off. Of course we do not
know which of the alternatives the firm will choose. Because of this, the missing
behavioral link is amended by the standard assumption that the firm will lower the
price in order to sell off. The magnitude of the price cut is left to chance.
Even if the propensity function is – from the perspective of an outside observer – in
principle correctly specified there is, because of other influences, no guarantee that
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the price cut will bring the stock of products closer to the reference value in period t.
The propensity function is one element in a trial and error process with practically
unpredictable effects on the agent’s operating experience and expectations. We
arrive here at an open interface to a theory of learning.
This, then, is the complete 5-type propensity function as general formal expression
of behavior at a glance:
...
Z = sgn
(
sgn
(
Z−Zθ
))
Pr ({...Z}) . (15)
To clarify the formal relationships is one thing, to find the right behavioral link
between the information and the action function is quite another. This is the next
analytical step.
4 Price taking and price setting in the product market
The sales ratio is defined as:
ρX ≡ XO . (16)
A sales ratio ρX = 1 indicates that the quantity sold X and the quantity produced O
are equal or, in other words, that the product market is cleared.
The expenditure ratio is defined as:
ρE ≡ CY . (17)
An expenditure ratio ρE = 1 indicates that consumption expenditures C are equal to
total income Y , in other words, that the household sector’s budget is balanced.
From (3) and the other axioms and the definitions follows the price as dependent
variable:
P =
ρE
ρX
W
R
(
1+
DN
WL
)
. (18)
This is the general structural axiomatic Law of Supply and Demand for the pure
consumption economy with one firm (for the generalization see 2014). In brief,
the price equation states that the price is equal to the product of the expenditure
ratio ρE , the inverse of the sales ratio ρX , unit wage costs WR , and the distributional
factor 1+ρD. The structural axiomatic price formula is testable in principle and
fully replaces supply-function–demand-function–equilibrium.
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Conditional price flexibility is, clearly, an algebraic concept. Nothing is assumed
about the behavior of the firm. Yet, what is possible, is a behavioral interpretation.
What (18) then amounts to is price taking.
Under the condition of price setting and budget balancing one gets this switch of
directionality:
ρX =
1
P
W
R
(
1+
DN
WL
)
if ρE = 1.
(19)
In the simplified case of budget balancing the sales ratio depends on the price setting
of the firm, on unit wage costs and the distributional factor. Changes of the wage
rate, the productivity, distributed profit, and employment all act in conjunction with
the product price upon the sales ratio.
5 Product market clearing by directed price setting
5.1 The stock of products
In the general case markets are not cleared. This has some obvious consequences,
the first one is that the firm’s stock of hitherto unsold products grows and shrinks in
the course of time.
The change of the stock of – durable – products in period t is defined as the excess
between output O and the quantity bought X by the households:
∆O¯≡ O−X ≡ O(1−ρX) . (20)
The sales ratio comes from (19).
The stock at the end of an arbitrary number of periods t¯ is given by definition as the
numerical integral of all previous stock changes plus the initial endowment:
O¯t ≡
t
∑
t=1
∆O¯t + O¯0. (21)
The resulting interrelation between the sales ratio and the stock is given by
O¯t ≡
t
∑
t=1
Ot (1−ρXt) if O¯0 = 0. (22)
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Seen from the firm’s perspective, the stock at the end of period t¯ is either too
large, too small, or just right. This depends on the firm’s target stock which is
denoted by O¯θ . The firm’s objective is not to clear the market in the period under
consideration, that is, to sell exactly the current output O, but to bring the actual
stock as close as possible to the target stock, i.e.,
O¯t − O¯θt ⇒ 0. (23)
It is assumed that the firm chooses the price as instrument variable in order to adapt
the actual stock to the target stock. That is, the price is no longer determined by
systemic conditions but set by some agent within the firm. The firm now becomes
the price setter.
5.2 Directed price setting
The price setting behavior is formalized by this propensity function:
(−1,0,1)t = sgn
(
sgn
(
O¯t−1− O¯θt−1
))
...
Pt = (−1,0,1)t Pr (0≤
...
Pt ≤ x)
(24)
The upper part says that the firm lowers the price if the actual stock is above the
target stock and vice versa. The lower part combines the direction of change with a
random rate of change. Figure 4 shows how this behavioral assumption plays out in
the product market over an observation span of 50 periods.
Figure 4: The three dimensional product market: directed price setting in dependence of the deviation
T 0 of the actual stock from the target stock
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The independent variables W, R, L, D, N in (19) vary with random rates of change
that are symmetrically distributed around zero and thereby produce the random
environment. Note in particular that the firm’s current output (2), which is different
from total supply, is a composed random variable. The paths of real supply O and
demand X diverge over the whole time span of observation.
The product market is cleared at the recurring intersections of the inventory curve
with the target line, i.e., at O¯t − O¯θt = 0. It can immediately be seen that the price
falls if the actual stock is above the target stock and vice versa. Over the whole
time span of observation the market is repeatedly cleared and the actual stock keeps
reasonably close to the target stock. Whether the price setting functions beyond
the span of observation cannot be said and is left open here. While the output path
is relatively stable the sales path runs counter to the price movements. It should
be obvious that recurring intersections of the inventory curve with the target line
cannot be interpreted as equilibrium in the familiar sense. No such thing exists.
Finally, monetary profit is given with:
Qm ≡ PX−WL (25)
It is a necessary condition for the functioning of the product market that profit is –
more often than not – positive. For the detailed treatment of profit see (2015). In
the present context profit is always greater zero and equal to distributed profit.
The propensity function (24) embodies a rather simple behavioral rule. Clearly,
it is possible to formulate a more sophisticated rule that reduces the swings of
the inventory cycle. For the moment, the simple rule is good enough to make the
decisive point, i.e., that the market representation of Figure 4 fully replaces the
untenable supply-demand-equilibrium cross.
The content of Figure 4 can be summarized as follows. The price setting co-
determines the sales ratio ρX which in turn changes the stock of products according
to (20). Via the behavioral link (24) there is a feedback from the stock on the price,
which quite naturally explains the inventory cycle. Because of the random changes
of the independent variables this cycle cannot be completely eliminated because it
is impossible for the firm to know the current market clearing price exactly. Market
clearing happens, but only transitorily.
5.3 Extensions
In the structural axiomatic context the argument of the information function adopts
the role of the first derivative. The formal criterion of a behavioral optimum is that
the value of the respective information function is zero, i.e., economic man/woman
has reached his/her target Z−Zθ = 0. In this case no further adaptive action results:...
Z = 0. A general behavioral optimum is attained if all information functions realize
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in the same period the configuration b2 of Figure 3. In this case the economic system
becomes stationary. Stationarity is different from simultaneous equilibrium. The
latter is a nonentity.
Above, we have applied one propensity function for the price setting of one firm.
With successive differentiation of the business sector successively more propensity
functions have to be applied. Obviously, there is no hindrance to do that. Moreover,
there is also no hindrance to apply propensity functions to all agents individually.
The much discussed question of microfoundations is pointless in the structural
axiomatic context because the axiom set refers to one single firm, in other words,
the business sector consists initially of one firm. This means that micro and macro
fall into one. Starting from the compact business sector only differentiation is
possible. Successive differentiation ultimately ends at the individual agent. Hence,
there is no such thing as microfoundations, there is structural axiomatization, the
propensity function, and successive differentiation. Taken together, this analytical
procedure yields a consistent whole down to the individual level and, most important
of all, testable theorems. Methodologically, the structural axiomatic approach is the
only acceptable game in town.
The determination of the target value involves expectations. This means that target
values can change fast and that they are generally more volatile than the actual
values. Most important, target values may change simultaneously for a greater
number of agents. This explains behavioral instability. For our present purposes,
though, it is not necessary to occupy ourselves with the determination of targets,
hence they are without further explanation taken as given.
6 Conclusion
Behavioral assumptions, rational or otherwise, are not solid enough to be eligible
as first principles of theoretical economics. Hence all endeavors to lay the formal
foundation on a new site and at a deeper level actually need no further vindication.
The present paper submits four non-behavioral axioms as groundwork for the
theoretical reconstruction of the evolving monetary economy. To formally capture
human behavior the axiom set is complemented by the propensity function.
The propensity function is a compact formal expression of random, semi-random,
and deterministic behavioral assumptions (type-A to type-E). Thus, the structural
axiomatic core and the behavioral propensity function constitute the building blocks
of every structural axiomatic model.
The propensity function is the general formal expression of the intentionality of
human action. It does not demand any sophisticated calculations from the agent.
Economic man/woman is formally portrayed as a bundle of propensity functions.
The propensity function contains the information and the action function. The
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information function refers to the difference between the agent’s actual and desired
state. The agent’s course of action results from the behavioral link between the
output of the information function and the output of the action function.
The information function as a constituent of the propensity function takes the role
of the first derivative; a value of zero indicates in the axiomatic context a behavioral
optimum. A general behavioral optimum is logically possible.
The directedness that originates from the information and action function produces
stochastic stability and optimality out of randomness and keeps the economy within
viable boundaries for a reasonable time span. Two type-C propensity functions –
one for the business sector and one for the household sector – are sufficient to clear
the product market at different points in time. This structural axiomatic account of
market coordination precludes the fictitious notion of a simultaneous equilibrium.
The propensity function works with all roughly quantifiable targets in all possible
economic worlds – it is truly general.
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